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An interim report from the Rail Accident Investigation Branch has revealed that the red signal which was passed a few seconds before the rear-end collision south of Bedford on 19 June this year was not equipped with a SPAD alarm.
SPAD alarms are sounded in the relevant signalling centre, to draw attention to a signal passed at danger, but the signal concerned had been assessed as ‘low risk’.
The driver of the second train was killed in the collision, and more than 160 people were injured.
The leading train. from Nottingham, had come to a stand because of an AWS fault. It was already running 18 minutes late, and was overtaken by the second train, a service from Corby.
This should have stopped at a signal which was showing red to protect the Nottingham train, but analysis of data shows that the Corby train was still accelerating when it passed the red signal.
When the driver saw the stationary train ahead, the brakes were applied, about ten seconds before the collision, but this was too late to stop the train, which was still travelling at about 50mph (80km/h) at the point of impact, derailing both trains.
This report also reveals that the crew could not contact West Hampstead panel box by radio to report the collision, because neither train had any power. Instead, the box was notified by a passenger who used a signal post telephone, and a second call was made by the driver of the leading train, who confirmed that the line was blocked.
Because the signaller could not be contacted immediately, track circuit operating clips were applied by staff to protect the adjacent lines.
In April this year the RSSB announced that it was phasing out signal post telephones, saying that there is ‘clear evidence that signal post telephones offer limited safety benefit. Most are rarely used and represent a significant and ongoing cost to the industry’.
Readers’ comments
While RAIB still have much work to complete before issuing the final report into the tragic collision at Elstow the interim report now released contains much to enable an understanding of the circumstances. I believe one thing that does need to be urgently addressed is the arrangements for train protection given that the loss of power to both units left the radios in the undamaged cabs inoperable to the surviving crew members. While laudable that a passenger from one of the trains was able to make contact with the signalling centre at West Hampstead it raises questions to the recent RSSB recommendation phasing out SPT use. While understandable that the traction supply from the OLE was lost due to the collision where was the backup to ensure such a vital piece of equipment was available when most needed? Quite correctly track circuit operating clips were applied providing protection however had this been an axle counter equipped line such clips would have been ineffective making it more vital that the cab radio was available to provide primary protection. Chris Jones-Bridger, Buckley, Flintshire
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